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BANK'S RIGHT OF SETOFF IN VIRGINIA
A bank setoff occurs when a bank satisfies a debt that a depositor owes
to the bank by transferring funds out of the depositor's account., The theory
underlying a bank's right to setoff is that depositing funds in a bank account
creates a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and the depositor.
2
The deposited funds become the property of the bank, and the depositor
becomes a creditor of the bank.3 The bank may setoff deposited funds to
satisfy any obligation that the depositor owes to the bank." A typical setoff
occurs when a bank withdraws funds from a depositor's account and applies
those funds to a loan that the depositor has not repaid.
5
A bank may exercise the right to setoff when the proposed setoff transac-
tion meets certain conditions. 6 First, a bank may exercise its right of setoff
only if the depositor's debt to the bank has matured.7 More specifically, a
1. See Sears v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 562 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. 1977) (bank
may setoff deposits equal to amount of debt that depositor owes to bank); Reserve Bank v. State
Bank, 150 Va. 423, 430-31, 143 S.E. 697, 700 (1928) (bank may apply general deposits of depositor
to any debt that depositor owes to bank); see also Clark, Bank Exercise of Setoff. Avoiding
the Pitfalls, 98 BANKING L.J. 196, 196-97 (1981) (setoff occurs when bank satisfies debt that
depositor owes to bank by transferring funds out of depositor's account); TeSelle, Banker's Right
of Setoff, Banker Beware, 34 OKLA. L. Rav. 40, 40 (1981) (bank may setoff funds in depositor's
account to satisfy debt depositor owes to bank). See generally Note, Automatic Extinction of
Cross-Demands: Compensatio From Rome to California, 53 CALn. L. REv. 224 (1965) (discus-
sion of origins of bank's right to setoff funds).
2. See Reserve Bank v. State Bank, 150 Va. 423, 430-31, 143 S.E. 697, 699-700 (1928).
In Reserve Bank v. State Bank, the Virginia Supreme Court noted that the general rule concern-
ing bank deposits is that upon deposit, the funds become property of the bank. Id. The Reserve
Bank court stated that since funds on deposit are property of the bank, the depositor is the bank's
creditor. Id. at 430, 143 S.E. at 699. Since the bank is the debtor of the depositor and a depositor
taking out a bank loan is the debtor of the bank, the Reserve Bank court held that a bank could
setoff the depositor's account in satisfaction of a loan debt that the depositor owes to the bank.
Id. Setoff is proper because setoff only cancels the debt that each party owes to the other. Id.
at 433, 143 S.E. at 700.
3. See id. (setoff occurs because depositor who owes money to a bank is both creditor
and debtor of bank).
4. See id. (since bank holds deposited funds in credit for depositor, bank may use those
funds to satisfy debt that depositor owes bank).
5. See supra note I and accompanying text (bank uses right of setoff to satisfy obligations
depositor owes to bank); infra note 99 (Virginia banks do not use remedy of setoff often since
most depositors who owe bank money are in financial difficulty and have no funds in their accounts).
6. See FDIC v. Pioneer State Bank, 155 N.J. Super. 381, 386, 382 A.2d 958, 962 (1977)
(list of conditions that bank must satisfy before exercising right of setoff against depositor's ac-
count); TeSelle, supra note 1, at 42 (conditions of setoff are that funds on deposit must be prop-
erty of depositor-debtor, depositor-debtor must have deposited funds in general account with
no restrictions, and depositor-debtor must owe bank money).
7. See Crocker Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Control Metals Corp., 566 F.2d 631, 637 (9th Cir.
1977) (bank may setoff funds in depositor's account only after debt depositor owes to bank has
matured); Kane v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.2d 534, 537-38 (5th Cir.) (debt depositor owes to bank
must have matured before bank can setoff funds in depositor's account to satisfy debt), cert.
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bank may not setoff deposited funds to satisfy prospective debts8 even if the
prospective debt is certain to mature shortly. 9 Additionally, the funds subject
to setoff must be the property of the depositor instead of property belonging
to a third party.'I Moreover, a bank may setoff a depositor's funds provided
the depositor has placed no restrictions on the use of the deposited funds."
Even though a depositor may deposit funds for a restricted special purpose
such as payroll accounts,' 2 escrow accounts,' 3 and trust accounts,' 4 a bank
denied, 287 U.S. 603 (1932); Walter v. National City Bank, 330 N.E.2d 425, 427 (Ohio 1975)
(bank may setoff funds in depositor's account if debt depositor owes bank has matured). A bank
considers a debt mature when, in the case of a demand note or loan, the bank calls the note,
or in the case of a debt that carries a specific maturity date, that date passes. Clark, supra note
1, at 206. Once a debt is mature, the bank will consider it safe to setoff the depositor's account
to satisfy the debt. Id.
8. See Clark, supra note 1, at 206 (banks must be careful not to exercise right of setoff
until depositor's debt actually matures).
9. See Prince v. West End Installation Serv. Inc., 575 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Mo. App. 1978)
(bank cannot defeat third party creditor's garnishment of bank account by asserting that depositor
owes money to bank on note not yet due).
10. See FDIC v. Pioneer State Bank, 155 N.J. Super. 381, 386, 382 A.2d 958, 962 (1977)
(one condition of bank's right to setoff is that setoff funds must be property of debtor); First
Nat'l Bank v. DeMorse, 26 S.W. 417, 419 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894) (bank's right of setoff extends
to all funds on deposit that depositor owns and which bank holds for general credit of depositor);
TeSelle, supra note 1, at 43 (bank's depositor-debtor must be owner, both legally and equitably,
of deposited funds before bank can setoff those funds); see also South Cent. Livestock Dealers,
Inc. v. Security State Bank of Dedley, 614 F.2d 1056, 1062 (5th Cir. 1980) (court assessed com-
pensatory and punitive damages against bank exercising right of setoff against account that bank
knew contained funds not belonging to depositor-debtor).
11. See FDIC v. Pioneer State Bank, 155 N.J. Super. 381, 386, 382 A.2d 958, 962 (1977)
(restrictions before bank can exercise right of setoff); infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text
(examples of types of accounts that bank cannot setoff because of restrictions on those accounts).
Courts will not allow a bank to exercise setoff against restricted or special purpose accounts
because a third party not owing money to the bank has an interest in the account. See, e.g.,
Glenn Justice Mortgage Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Fort Collins, 592 F.2d 567, 570 (10th Cir.
1979) (bank cannot setoff against special purpose accounts containing funds in which third party
has interest); United States v. Carlow, 323 F. Supp. 1310, 1316 (N.D. Pa. 1971) (bank could
not setoff funds that depositor deposited for special purpose to satisfy unrelated debt depositor
owed to bank); Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank v. Avco Fin. Serv., Inc., 129 Ga. App. 605,
611, 200 S.E.2d 309, 313-14 (1973) (bank could not enforce right to setoff funds in special escrow
account against true owners of funds contained in account because true owners owed no debt
to bank). But see In re Interborough Consol. Corp., 288 F. 334, 347 (2d Cir. 1923) (bank could
setoff funds depositor had deposited for specific purpose that remained subject to depositor's check).
12. See In re Saugus Gen. Hosp., Inc., 7 Bankr. 347, 353 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980) (bank
could not setoff funds in payroll account that bank knew contained funds dedicated solely to
meeting depositor's payroll), rev'd on other grounds, 698 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1983).
13. See Filosa v. Pecora, 44 Ill. App. 3d 912, 918, 358 N.E.2d 1213, 1217 (1976) (funds
depositor deposited in escrow account were not subject to setoff by bank on unrelated claim);
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Osage Supply Co., 186 Okla. 259, 261, 97 P.2d 3, 5 (1939)
(escrow account is special purpose account that is not subject to bank's right of setoff).
14. See Northern Ins. Co. v. Trader's Gate City Nat'l Bank, 239 Mo. App. 132, 139, 186
S.W.2d 491, 496-97 (1945) (although trust fund accounts are normally special accounts that banks




may setoff those funds provided the bank has no knowledge of the restricted
nature of the deposit. 5 No condition of setoff exists requiring a bank to give
a depositor any notice before exercising the setoff against the funds in the
depositor's account. 6 Whether a bank's right of setoff extends to bank ac-
counts containing funds exempt from creditor action is open to dispute. 7
In Bernardini v. Central National Bank of Richmond,'8 the Virginia
Supreme Court discussed the extent of a bank's right to setoff funds in a
depositor's account. 9 In Bernardini, the Virginia Supreme Court held that
a bank may setoff funds in a depositor's account to satisfy the depositor's
debt to the bank even though the funds in the account are statutorily exempt
from the reach of other creditors.2" In Bernardini, the Central National Bank
of Richmond (Bank) attempted to setoff the funds in a debtor-depositor's
account that included Social Security and Workmen's Compensation
payments.' Social Security payments are exempt from the reach of creditors
under federal statute,2" while Workmen's Compensation payments are exempt
15. See In re Goodson Steel Corp., 488 F.2d 776, 779-80 (5th Cir. 1974). In In re Goodson
Steel Corp., a bankrupt depositor set up a special account that the depositor had designed to
pay his payroll. Id. The bank, however, had not entered into an agreement with the depositor
concerning the special account. Id. No agreement existed that the bank should keep the special
payroll account separate and isolated from the depositor's other accounts. Id. at 780-81. The
Fifth Circuit held that the bank could setoff the funds in the payroll account since the depositor
could use the funds on deposit in any way he wished. Id. In the earlier Fifth Circuit case of
Ribaudo v. Citizens Natl Bank, a depositor similarly contended that a bank illegally setoff funds
in the depositor's payroll account. 261 F.2d 929, 933 (5th Cir. 1958). The Ribaudo court held
that the bank's setoff was proper since the payroll account was special in name only, and the
funds in the account were subject to the unlimited dominion of the depositor. Id. A special ac-
count is an account in which a third party, not the depositor, has an interest in the funds in
the account. TeSelle, supra note 1, at 43-4.
16. See FDIC v. First Mortgage Investors, 485 F. Supp. 445, 455 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (bank
can setoff matured debt without any notice to depositor-debtor); see also infra notes 78-86 (discussing
effect that lack of notice to depositor by bank exercising setoff has on depositor-debtor's chances
of asserting possible exemptions or defenses).
17. See infra notes 59-72 and accompanying text (discussing whether bank can exercise right
of setoff against accounts containing exempt funds).
18. 223 Va. 519, 290 S.E.2d 863 (1982).
19. Id. at 522, 290 S.E.2d at 865.
20. Id. at 521-22, 290 S.E.2d at 864-65. In Bernardini v. Central Nat'l Bank of Richmond,
Michael and Doris Bernardini deposited checks totaling $2,400.08 in a checking account at the
Central National Bank of Richmond (Bank). Id. at 521, 290 S.E.2d at 864. The deposit included
$1,780.36 in Social Security disability benefits, $386.00 in Workmen's Compensation benefits,
and $233.72 in wages. Id. Without giving notice to the Berardinis, the Bank setoff all of the
funds in the Bernardinis checking account to satisfy a business debt Mr. Bernardini owed the
Bank. Id. After the setoff, the Bernardinis wrote 27 checks paying personal bills which the Bank
subsequently dishonored because of insufficient funds. Id. Thereafter, the Bemardinis sued the
Bank seeking a return of the funds the Bank previously had setoff. Id.
21. Id. In Bernardini, the depositors contended that the Social Security and Workmen's
Compensation benefits that they had received were totally exempt from the reach of creditors
under federal and state law. Id.; see infra notes 22 & 23 (text of exemption statutes at issue
in Bernardini).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1982). 42 U.S.C. § 407 provides that Social Security benefits shall
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from the reach of creditors under a Virginia statute.23 Neither the Social Security
statute nor the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act expressly exempts its
benefits from a bank's right to setoff.24 The circuit court for the city of Rich-
mond in Bernardini held that the statutes in question were broad enough to
prohibit a bank's right to setoff and, therefore, governed the Bank's right
of setoff.2" The Virginia Supreme Court did not decide whether the Social
Security or Workmen's Compensation statutes covered a bank's right to setoff
since the Bank did not appeal the trial court's ruling.2 6 The Bank conceded
that the statutes were broad enough to cover its right to setoff and, therefore,
the Virginia Supreme Court assumed that the two statutes covered the Bank's
right of setoff without deciding whether the trial court's decision was correct.27
The Virginia Supreme Court held that when the Bernardinis deposited the funds
in a bank account and commingled those funds with nonexempt funds, the
funds lost their statutory exemptions.2" The Bernardini court concluded that
since the funds lost exempt status when the Bernardinis deposited and com-
mingled the funds with nonexempt funds in the account, the Bank could setoff
the funds in the depositor's account in partial satisfaction of a defaulted loan.29
The Bernardini court gave three rationales for holding that the bank could
setoff the funds in an account containing Workmen's Compensation benefits
and Social Security payments." Initially, the court held that the funds lost
their exempt status after the depositor commingled the exempt funds in a bank
account containing nonexempt funds. 3' Secondly, the court found that the
not be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or any other legal process. Id.; see
infra notes 67-69 (United States Supreme Court's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 407).
23. Va. Code § 65.1-82 (1950 & repl. vol. 1982). Section 65.1-82 of the Virginia Workmen's
Compensation Act provides that all compensation recipients receive pursuant to the Act shall
be exempt from all claims of creditors. Id.
24. See supra notes 22-23 (text of statutes specifically does not exempt Social Security benefits
or Workmen's Compensation benefits from bank's right of setoff).
25. 223 Va. at 519, 290 S.E.2d at 864 n. 4. The trial court in Bernardini found that although
the prohibitions against creditor action in the Social Security and Workmen's Compensation statutes
would cover a bank's right of setoff, the funds the Bernardinis received lost their statutory ex-
emption when the Bernardinis deposited and commingled the funds in a general account at the
Bank. Id. at 519, 290 S.E.2d at 864. Since the funds the Bernardinis deposited lost exempt status,
the trial court ruled that the Bank could setoff the funds on deposit in satisfaction of the debt
Mr. Bernardini owed to the Bank. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 522, 290 S.E.2d at 865; see infra notes 53-72 (exempt funds do not lose exempt
status upon deposit in a bank account); infra notes 47-53 (commingling exempt funds with nonex-
empt funds should not matter so long as depositor can trace funds to exempt source).
29. 223 Va. at 522, 290 S.E.2d at 865.
30. Id. at 521-22, 290 S.E.2d at 864-65; see infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (ra-
tionales Bernardini court gave in holding that Bank could exercise right of setoff).
31. 223 Va. at 521-22, 290 S.E.2d at 864-65. The Bernardini court held that the exempt
Social Security and Workmen's Compensation funds lost exempt status because the depositors
deposited the funds in a general checking account and commingled the exempt funds with nonex-
empt funds in a general checking account. Id. But cf. infra notes 50 & 53 (exempt benefits that
recipient deposits in bank account retain exemption so long as recipient can trace funds back
to source from which recipient derives exemption).
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funds would have retained their statutory exemptions if the depositors had
deposited the funds in a special account. 32 Finally, the Bernardini court, rely-
ing on banking policy, determined that the court should not allow the depositor
to claim an exemption defeating a bank's right to setoff because such an ex-
emption would place an "impossible burden" on the banking system by re-
quiring banks to determine the source of deposited funds before exercising
a setoff.3 3 The court reasoned that depositors could not expect a bank to in-
quire into the sources of funds in every account the bank was going to setoff.
3 4
The Bernardini court's decision is suspect because the decision expanded
a bank's right of setoff far beyond the accepted scope of the right . 3 The Ber-
nardini decision is faulty for three reasons. First, the court improperly held
that exempt funds lose exempt status when the recipient has deposited the
funds in a bank account and has commingled the exempt funds with nonex-
empt funds. 36 Secondly, the Bernardini court based its holding on the mistaken
32. 223 Va. at 552, 290 S.E.2d at 865. The Bernardini court stated that a depositor should
deposit exempt funds in a special account and keep those funds separate from nonexempt funds.
Id. Keeping the funds separate would enable the depositor to enjoy the "conveniences of modem
banking" by allowing the depositor to use the exempt funds without fear that creditors would
try to reach those funds. Id. But cf. infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (some Virginia
banks will not open special accounts for depositors that contain only exempt funds).
33. 223 Va. at 521, 290 S.E.2d at 864. The Bernardini court held that requiring banks
to determine whether funds in an account were exempt before exercising the bank's right of setoff
would place an "impossible burden" on the bank. Id. In support of the impossible burden ra-
tionale, the Bernardini court cited Cocke's Adm'r. v. LoyalL. Id.; see 150 Va. 336, 143 S.E.
881 (1928). In Cocke's, the administrator of an estate embezzled money from the estate by cashing
a check at the bank which was holding the funds of the estate in a trust account for the beneficiaries
of the estate. Id. at 337, 143 S.E. at 881. The estate sued the bank on the theory that the bank
had honored the check without inquiring into who had a right to the funds in the trust account.
Id. The Cocke's court rejected the theory, holding that banks do not have a duty to inquire
into private affairs of a trust to find out to whom the money belongs. Id. at 339, 143 S.E. at
882. The Cocke's court refused to place the burden on a bank of determining who the beneficiaries
are under a complicated trust arrangement. Id. In Bernardini, the Bank would not have had
to inquire into a complicated trust arrangement, but merely contact the depositor in an effort
to ascertain the sources of the funds in the account the Bank wanted to setoff. See 223 Va.
at 521-22, 290 S.E.2d at 864-65. See also Clark, supra note 1, at 206. One commentator has
suggested a method for dealing with the problem of banks having to ascertain the source of
funds in accounts before exercising setoff. Id. Specifically, the deposit agreement between a bank
and its depositor may contain a provision permitting the bank to setoff funds irrespective of
their source. Id. Presumably, if a depositor agrees that a bank may setoff funds irrespective
of the funds' source, the depositor effectively will waive the statutory exemption that applies
to certain benefits. See id. Whether a benefit recipient may waive a statutory exemption necessarily
would depend on the statutory language and a court's interpretation of the statute's language.
See VA. CODE § 65.1-82 (1950 & repl. vol. 1982) (since Workmen's Compensation exemption
statute does not state whether benefit recipient can waive exemption, courts interpreting statute
would decide whether recipient could waive exemption).
34. 223 Va. at 521-22, 290 S.E.2d at 864-65.
35. See infra notes 40-117 and accompanying text (reasons why Bernardini decision is suspect);
see also Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 356, 521 P.2d 441, 442, 113 Cal. Rptr.
449, 451 (1974) (bank exceeds scope of setoff when bank exercises setoff against account contain-
ing funds that depositor received from sources that are statutorily exempt from creditors).
36. See infra notes 53-72 and accompanying text (exempt funds retain exemption upon deposit
in bank account); infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (commingling exempt and nonexempt
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assumption that a depositor could set up a special account that would keep
funds derived from exempt sources out of the reach of creditors.37 Thirdly,
the court improperly characterized the account at issue in the case as a special
account and held that the Bank could setoff exempt funds since the Bank
had no knowledge of the special exempt nature of the funds in the account.3,
The Bernardini court improperly characterized the issue by discussing the theory
underlying a bank's right to setoff special purpose accounts instead of ex-
amining whether a bank can setoff an account containing statutorily exempt
funds.
3 9
The Bernardini court's assertion that statutorily exempt funds lose ex-
empt status when a recipient deposits the funds in a bank account and com-
mingles the funds with nonexempt funds lacks support of Virginia precedent.
Exempt funds do not lose the statutory exemption that keeps creditors from
reaching those funds simply upon deposit in a bank account."0 While no
funds in bank account does not destroy exemption if depositor can trace funds to exempt source).
In Wilson v. Virginia Nat'l Bank, the Virginia Supreme Court discussed an issue analogous to
whether exempt funds retain their exemption upon deposit in a bank account. 214 Va. 14, 15,
196 S.E.2d 920, 921 (1973). In Wilson, the plaintiff was trying to protect money in her bank
accounts from a judgment creditor by asserting her homestead exemption. Id. The money in
the bank accounts was life insurance proceeds. Id. The Wilson court construed the Virginia
homestead exemption liberally and held that the fact that the insurance proceeds protected by
the homestead exemption were in a bank account made no difference. Id. Although the Virginia
homestead exemption did not specifically protect funds in a bank account, the court allowed
the plaintiff-debtor to retain the funds. Id.
37. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (some Virginia banks will not open special
account that would prevent creditors from reaching exempt funds).
38. 223 Va. at 521-22, 290 S.E.2d at 864-65; see infra notes 101-117 and accompanying
text (Bernardini court confused issue in case by discussing whether Bank had knowledge of ex-
empt funds instead of discussing whether exempt funds lose exempt status upon deposit).
39. See infra notes 110-114 and accompanying text (Bernardini court confused special pur-
pose account with account containing funds that are exempt from creditors).
40. See Matthews v. Lewis, 617 S.W.2d 43, 44-45 (Ky. 1981). In Matthews v. Lewis, a
bank garnished the account of a depositor in response to a creditor's judgment against the depositor.
Id. at 43. The funds in the garnished account were the depositor's Workmen's Compensation
benefits. Id. The recipient deposited the exempt funds in a general checking account that also
contained nonexempt funds. Id. The depositor contended that the benefits did not lose their statutory
exemption from creditors simply because of deposit in the checking account. Id. The Matthews
court stated that checking account deposits do not change identity, but rather, retain the same
form as if the depositor had not deposited the funds but had received cash. Id. The court, therefore,
held that since the exempt funds on deposit did not change form, the exempt funds would remain
exempt until the recipient spent or invested the funds. Id. The court further stated that since
depositing funds in a checking account does not change the form of those funds, it was "sheer
intellectual folly" to argue that the Workmen's Compensation benefits were exempt until deposited
and that upon deposit the benefits lost exempt status and became completely available to creditors.
Id. at 45. Additionally, the Matthews court stated that a bank's right of setoff should be no
greater than a general creditor's rights. Id. Finally, the court rejected the argument that allowing
the exemption to remain in force after a depositor had deposited the funds would place the banks
in a difficult position and would subject the banks to possible liability. Id.; see infra notes 62-73
and accompanying text (United States Supreme Court cases holding that benefits from exempt
sources do not lose exemption upon deposit in bank account).
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Virginia case expressly discusses a bank's right to setoff an account contain-
ing statutorily exempt funds, the Virginia Supreme Court discussed the rela-
tionship of setoffs and exempt funds in Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Ring." The
Ring court held that even though a Virginia exemption statute did not protect
funds expressly from setoff, courts should construe exemption statutes liberally
to protect exempt benefits from the reach of all creditors.4 2 The Ring court
stated that since the spirit of exemption statutes is to protect exempt property
from all creditors, statutorily exempt funds should be free from setoffs."3
Although the Ring court did not discuss whether deposited funds retain ex-
empt status, the court did cite a case that held statutorily exempt funds do
not lose exempt status simply upon deposit in a bank account." Even though
the appellants in Bernardini contended that the Ring ruling should control
the decision,"5 the Bernardini court, without even mentioning the Ring deci-
sion, decided that statutorily exempt funds lose exempt status when a bank
depositor deposits exempt funds in a bank account and commingles those funds
with nonexempt funds.46 Other cases considering whether exempt funds lose
exempt status upon commingling with nonexempt funds in a bank account
have discussed the concept of "tracing." 47 Generally, tracing involves the prob-
lem of identifying the source of funds that a recipient claims are exempt from
creditors.4" For example, the tracing issue would arise if a recipient of exempt
funds attempted to prevent a creditor from reaching the funds the recipient
41. 167 Va. 121, 187 S.E. 449 (1936). In Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Ring, an insurance
beneficiary owed his insurance company $9,000 pursuant to a loan. Id. at 123, 187 S.E. at 450.
The insurance company owed the beneficiary $3,800 in disability benefits. Id. The insurance company
setoff the benefits owed to the beneficiary against the debt the beneficiary owed to the insurance
company. Id. The beneficiary argued that the setoff was illegal because the disability benefits
were exempt from the claims of creditors. Id. The insurance company contended that the statute
did not prohibit setoff expressly. Id. at 124, 187 S.E. at 451. The Ring court construed the ex-
emption statute liberally and held that the insurance company could not setoff the debt that
the beneficiary owed against the benefits the insurance company owed the beneficiary. Id.
42. Id. The Ring court noted that strong support from cases, treatises, and textbooks ex-
isted for the proposition that exemption statutes should preclude setoffs. Id. The court further
cited many cases and found a widely accepted doctrine that courts should construe exemption
statues that do not mention setoff to preclude setoff. Id.
43. Id. at 125, 187 S.E. at 452. The Ring court stated that the spirit of exemption statutes
is to protect exempted property from all creditors and not just from creditor's remedies expressly
enumerated in an exemption statute. Id.
44. Id. at 127, 187 S.E. at 453; see First Nat'l of Cushing v. Funnell, 144 Okla. 188, 190,
290 P. 177, 178 (1930) (bank could not setoff funds in general account because funds were ex-
empt and retained exemption after deposit in bank account even though exemption statute did
not mention setoff specifically).
45. Brief for Appellant at 7-9, Bernardini v. Central Nat'l Bank of Richmond, 223 Va.
519, 290 S.E.2d 463 (1982).
46. See 223 Va. at 521-22, 290 S.E.2d at 464-65.
47. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Falcone, 130 N.J. Super. 517, 518, 327 A.2d
699, 700 (1974) (statutory exemption protecting Social Security and Workmen's Compensation
benefits applies to funds recipient has deposited in bank account so long as funds are traceable
to exempt source).
48. See In re Estate of Vary, 65 Mich. App. 447, 449, 237 N.W.2d 498, 499 (1976), aff'd
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had deposited in a bank account."9 The recipient would have to demonstrate
that the funds came from exempt sources instead of nonexempt sources. 0 In
Bernardini, the issue of tracing the source of the funds was not before the
court.5' The fact that the Bernardini court did not discuss directly the tracing
issue is important because the court held that the deposited funds lost exempt
status when the depositor commingled the funds with nonexempt funds . 2 Com-
mingling exempt funds with nonexempt funds in a bank account will only
401 Mich. 340, 258 N.W.2d 11 (1977). In In re Estate of Vary, the state of Michigan filed a
claim against an estate for delinquent hospital bills. Id. at 449, 237 N.W.2d at 499. The state
attempted to reach a bank account containing exempt Social Security benefits to satisfy the debt.
Id. The Vary court noted that since the underlying purpose of the Social Security system is to
protect beneficiaries from financial difficulties, Social Security benefits remain exempt after deposit
in a bank account as long as the deposits are traceable to an exempt source. Id. at 450, 237
N.W.2d at 501. The Vary court did not give any guidelines on the tracing issue. See id. In Michigan
Nat'l Bank v. Flowers Mobile Homes Sales, Inc., the North Carolina Court of Appeals discussed
tracing deposits in a bank account to the source of the deposits. 26 N.C. App. 690, 694, 217
S.E.2d 108, 111 (1975). In Flowers, a third party obtained a judgment against Flowers Mobile
Homes and levied Flowers' bank account to satisfy the jugment. Id. at 693, 217 S.E.2d at I10.
Flowers' bank had a security interest on the proceeds from the sale of mobile homes that Flowers
deposited in the bank account. Id. Flowers' bank, therefore, objected to the third party's levy
on the ground that the bank was entitled to the funds in the account. Id. The statute controlling
the situation stated that the bank's security interest applied to the "identifiable proceeds" of
the mobile home sales. Id. After stating that no definition of identifiable proceeds existed, the
Flowers court applied the general rule concerning commingling trust funds with nontrust funds
in a bank account. Id. at 694, 217 S.E.2d at Ill. The rule the Flowers court applied stated that
commingling trust funds with nontrust funds in a mixed account will not destroy the identity
of the trust funds if the trust funds are traceable to a separate source. Id. The Flowers court
then stated that the rule on the tracing of trust funds is that courts presume the deposited trust
funds remain idle in the account. Id. For example, if a bank trustee deposited $5,000 in trust
funds in a bank account already containing $2,000 in nontrust funds and later withdrew $2,500,
courts presume the remaining $4,500 to be trust funds. See id. Under the rule, therefore, any
funds in a bank account the depositor claims are exempt would be exempt if the depositor could
show that he had made a large enough deposit of exempt funds to cover the amount of funds
in the account. See id.; see also Robert P. Butts & Co. v. Estate of Butts, 119 Ill. App. 2d
242, 248, 255 N.E.2d 622, 626 (1970) (person commingling trust with nontrust funds bears burden
of identifying source of funds in commingled account).
49. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Falcone, 130 N.J. Super. 517, 518, 327 A.2d
699, 700 (1974) (if debtor can identify source of funds in bank account as exempt from creditors,
creditor cannot reach funds in bank account).
50. See First Nat'l Master Charge v. Gilardi, 44 Ohio App. 2d 383, 324 N.E.2d 576 (1975).
In First Nat'l Master Charge v. Gilardi, the Ohio Appellate Court held that welfare funds a
recipient had deposited in a bank account retained exempt status, thereby preventing a judgment
creditor from garnishing the bank account. Id. at 386, 324 N.E.2d at 578. The Gilardi court
noted that the holding required, as most cases involving a similar issue also would require, the
tracing of funds on deposit to determine the amount attributable to exempt sources. Id. The
court did not state which party would have to identify the source of the funds, or give any guidelines
for accomplishing the tracing. See id.; see also Stahl v. Stahl, 91 Idaho 794, -, 430 P.2d
685, 689 (1967) (in divorce case, commingling of separate property with community property
in bank account does not convert separate property into community property so long as separate
property is identifiable and traceable).
51. See 223 Va. at 519-522, 290 S.E.2d at 863-865.
52. See id.; infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (commingling exempt funds with nonex-
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destroy the exempt status if the depositor cannot identify or trace the source
of the funds. 3 The Bernardini court, therefore, should have discussed the trac-
ing issue before holding that commingling exempt and nonexempt funds
destroys the exemption. 4 The Bernardini court did state that requiring banks
to determine the source of funds in an account before exercising setoff would
place an "impossible burden" on the bank." Tracing, however, would place
the burden on the depositor, not the bank, of proving that the funds in the
account were exempt.5 6 In Bernardini, no problem existed with tracing the
funds in the account to an exempt source since in stating the facts of the case,
the court expressly identified the amount of the funds that came from exempt
sources." Since the Virginia Supreme Court did identify which funds in the
account were from exempt sources, commingling the exempt funds with nonex-
empt funds in the bank account should have made no difference in the out-
come of the case. 8
empt funds in bank account will not destroy exempt status if depositor can trace deposits to
exempt source).
53. See In re Klein, 10 Bankr. 356, 357 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1981) (bank could not setoff ex-
empt funds in bank account even though depositor had commingled exempt funds with nonex-
empt funds in bank account). An analogous issue to commingling exempt and nonexempt funds
in a bank account is the commingling, in divorce situations, of separate and community property
in a bank account. Courts addressing the commingling issue in divorce situations uniformly hold
that separate property commingled with community property in a bank account will retain its
separate identity if the owner can trace the property to a separate source. See, e.g., Thomasset
v. Thomasset, 122 Cal. App. 2d 116, 122, 264 P.2d 626, 631 (1953) (separate property com-
mingled with community property in bank account remains separate if traceable to separate source);
Stahl v. Stahl, 91 Idaho 794,-_., 430 P.2d 685, 689 (1967) (commingling community and separate
property does not convert separate property into community property if separate property is
traceable); Graves v. United States Rubber Co., 237 La. 505, 509, 111 So. 2d 752, 755 (1959)
(mere mixing of separate and community funds in same bank account does not convert entire
account into community property if separate funds are traceable with sufficient certainty to establish
separate ownership); see also Huie, Separate Claims to Reimbursement From Community Prop-
erty in Louisiana, 27 TuL. L. REv. 143 (1953). Huie argues that the mere mixing of separate
and community funds in the same bank account automatically does not convert the entire ac-
count into community property since tracing of separate funds may be feasible. Id. at 175. Huie
states that while the commingled account does not become community property immediately,
in the usual case of many withdrawals and deposits involving the account, it may be impossible
to identify the source of the funds in the account. Id. at 175, 206.
54. See supra note 53 (commingling exempt and nonexempt funds in bank account is only
important if funds are not traceable to exempt source).
55. 223 Va. at 521, 290 S.E.2d at 864; see supra note 33 (analyzing impossible burden
rationale Bernardini court asserted in support of -its holding).
56. See Robert P. Butts & Co. v. Estate of Butts, 119 Il. App. 2d 242, 248, 255 N.E.2d
622, 626 (1970) (person commingling trust with nontrust funds bears burden of identifying source
of funds in commingled bank account).
57. 223 Va. at 521-22, 290 S.E.2d at 864-65. In Bernardini, the Virginia Supreme Court
specifically stated that $1,780.36 of the amount on deposit in the bank account was exempt Social
Security benefits and $386.00 of the amount on deposit in the account was exempt Workmen's
Compensation benefits. Id.
58. See supra notes 47, 50 & 52-53 and accompanying text (if depositor can trace funds
in bank account to exempt source, exemption statute applies and prevents creditors from reaching
exempt funds).
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The Bernardini decision is also incorrect to the extent that the court based
its decision on the ground that exempt funds lose exempt status upon deposit
in a bank account. 9 Most courts have held that statutorily exempt funds re-
main exempt even after deposit in a bank account.60 Moreover, the United
States Supreme Court has decided a line of cases holding that exempt funds
remain exempt after deposit in a bank account." For example, in Lawrence
v. Shaw, 62 the Supreme Court held that money from veterans' benefits that
was exempt from creditors under a federal statute remained exempt even after
the recipient had deposited the money in a bank account. 63 The Shaw Court
held that the funds would retain exempt status until the beneficiary either spends
or permanently invests the money. 6 The Shaw Court further held that the
exemption would remain in force even after a beneficiary had deposited the
funds in a bank account so that the deposits would be subject to the depositor's
59. See Colton v. Martell, 79 Misc. 2d 190, 191, 359 N.Y.S.2d 632, 633 (1974) (Social
Security benefits do not lose exemption merely because of deposit in recipient's bank account).
60. See In re Klein, 10 Bankr. 356, 358 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1981). In In re Klein, a recipient
of retirement benefits deposited the benefits in a credit union account. Id. at 357. The credit
union setoff the funds in the recipient's account in satisfaction of a debt the recipient owed to
the credit union. Id. The Klein court stated that since the recipient's retirement benefits were
exempt from creditors, the credit union could not exercise setoff because the retirement benefits
retained exempt status even after the recipient had deposited the benefits in the credit union ac-
count. Id. The Klein court further held that commingling the funds in the credit union account
with nonexempt funds made no difference in deciding that exempt funds retain exempt status
after deposit in a bank account. Id. at 358; see Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352,
371-72, 521 P.2d 441, 453, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449, 463 (1974) (bank may not setoff funds on deposit
depositor received from disability benefits since disability benefits are exempt from creditors);
First Nat'l Master Charge v. Gilardi, 44 Ohio App. 2d 383, 387, 324 N.E.2d 576, 578 (1975)
(depositor does not lose statutory exemption merely by depositing funds in checking account).
But see McCabe v. Fee, 279 Or. 437, 439, 568 P.2d 661, 662 (1977) (Workmen's Compensation
benefits deposited in bank account lost exemption upon deposit because exemption statute clearly
stated benefits are exempt only prior to receipt by beneficiary). Funds retaining exempt status
after deposit in a bank account are not subject to a bank's right of setoff. See Finance Accep-
tance Co. v. Breaux, 160 Colo. 510, -, 419 P.2d 955, 958 (1966) (obvious legislative intent
of exemption statute is to protect benefit recipients from all creditors including bank's right to setoff).
61. See infra notes 62-74 and accompanying text (Supreme Court cases holding statutorily
exempt funds do not lose exemption upon deposit).
62. 300 U.S. 245 (1937). In Lawrence v. Shaw, a recipient of veterans' benefits owed the
state of North Carolina property tax. Id. at 246. The recipient had deposited the benefits in
a bank account with no special designation. Id. at 247. Under a federal statute, the benefits
were exempt from all creditors. Id. at 245. The local authorities garnished the bank account
in partial satisfaction of the property taxes the recipient owed. Id. at 247. The state of North
Carolina contended that the deposits lost their exemption upon deposit in the bank account.
Id. The Shaw Court disagreed, holding that the funds retained exempt status even after deposit
in a bank account. Id. at 249-50.
63. Id. The Shaw Court stated Congress did not intend veterans' benefits that Congress
had exempted from creditors while in the hands of the recipients to lose exempt status simply
upon deposit in a bank where the depositor could draw checks on the funds in the usual manner. Id.
64. Id. at 250. In stating that exempt veterans' benefits remain exempt until the recipient
spends or invests the benefits, the Shaw Court did not attempt to define how a court could deter-
mine whether a benefit recipient had spent or permanently invested the benefits. See id.
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draft upon demand. In Porter v. Aetna Casualty Co.,66 the Supreme Court
affirmed the Shaw decision by holding that certain benefits the-government
paid pursuant to, and exempt under, a federal statute6 7 remained exempt not-
withstanding deposit in a bank account.6" Reasoning that courts should con-
strue exemption statutes liberally, the Porter Court determined that funds which
a recipient has not converted into permanent investments should retain ex-
empt status.69 In Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board," the Supreme Court
interpreted the statutory exemption applicable to Social Security benefits and
held that creditors could not reach exempt Social Security benefits under any
circumstances. 7' The Philpott Court further held that Social Security benefits
retained their exemption after a recipient had deposited the benefits in a bank
account. 7 The Bernardini decision, like the Philpott decision, dealt with Social
Security benefits that are exempt from creditors, yet held that the deposited
funds lost their exemption upon the depositor's commingling of the exempt
funds with nonexemption funds. 7 The Bernardini court dismissed the Philpott
holding in a footnote by stating that the cases were factually distinguishable
since the only funds in the bank account in Philpott came from Social Secur-
ity benefits while the exempt funds in Bernardini were in an account contain-
65. Id.
66. 370 U.S. 159 (1962). In Porter v. Aetna Casualty Co., a veteran was receiving federal
disability benefits. Id. at 159. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Veterans Ad-
ministration benefits remained exempt after the recipient had deposited the benefits in a bank
account. Id. at 159-60. A creditor of the veteran had recovered a judgment against the veteran
and the creditor had attached the benefits in the bank account to satisfy the judgment. Id. at
160. The Supreme Court held the attachment invalid because the benefits retained exempt status
even after the veteran had deposited the benefits in a bank account. Id. at 162.
67. 38 U.S.C. § 3101 (1982). The exemption portion of the Veterans Disability Benefits
statute states that benefits paid to veterans under the act are exempt from the claims of all creditors,
and are not subject to attachment, levy, seizure, or any other legal process. Id.; cf. supra note
22 (text of Social Security exemption).
68. Porter v. Aetna Casualty Co., 370 U.S. 159, 161-62 (1962). The Porter Court stated
that if funds a veteran received from veterans' benefits were available for a veteran's support
and maintenance, the funds would remain statutorily exempt. Id. at 161.
69. Id. at 162.
70. 409 U.S. 413 (1973). In Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., a trustee of a recipient
of Social Security disability benefits had deposited the benefits in a bank account for the reci-
pient. Id. at 414. A state welfare board attemptd to attach the funds in the bank account to
satisfy a claim that the board asserted the recipient owed. Id. The Supreme Court held that the
benefits retained exempt status in the recipient's bank account and that the welfare board could
not reach the benefits. Id. at 417.
71. Id. The Supreme Court in Philpott stated that the Social Security benefits exemption
statute in 42 U.S.C. § 407 creates a broad bar preventing all claimants or creditors from reaching
Social Security benefits. Id.; see supra note 22 (text of Social Security exemption statute).
72. 409 U.S. at 416. The Philpott Court cited the Porter case for the proposition that Social
Security benefits, which are analogous to the veteran's benefits involved in Porter, retain exempt
status from creditors even after the recipient has deposited the benefits in a bank account. Id.;
see supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (discussing Porter).
73. 223 Va. at 521, 290 S.E.2d at 464.
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ing nonexempt funds. 74 In essence, the Bernardini decision emphasized the
commingling issue."' By holding that exempt funds lose exempt status upon
deposit in a bank account, the Bernardini decision is unreasonable in light
of the Supreme Court's contrary position in Shaw, Porter, and Philpott, which
established that the deposit of exempt funds in a bank account will not destroy
the exemption allowing creditors to reach exempt funds.
7 6
Notwithstanding the Virginia Supreme Court's misinterpretation of the
Supreme Court precedent, the Bernardini decision unnecessarily places banks
in a better position than garnishing creditors who are exercising an analogous
right." The issue of whether a bank can setoff an account containing exempt
funds is analogous to whether a creditor can garnish an account containing
exempt funds because a garnishing creditor is in the same position as the bank
in that each is trying to reach funds which the debtor may claim are exempt
from creditors." While complete uniformity does not exist among courts con-
cerning whether a nonbank creditor can garnish accounts containing statutorily
exempt funds, the majority of courts have held statutorily exempt funds re-
main exempt after deposit in a bank account." 9 Most of the courts do not
74. Id. at 521, 290 S.E.2d at 464 n. 4. The Bernardini court distinguished Philpott on the
grounds that the benefit recipients in Bernardini had commingled the exempt funds with nonex-
empt funds while the funds on deposit in Philpott were all exempt funds. Id. Few cases exist
discussing whether commingling exempt funds with nonexempt funds destroys the exemption.
See In re Klein, 10 Bankr. 356, 358 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1981) (bank could not setoff statutorily
exempt funds recipient had deposited in bank account even though recipient had commingled
funds with other nonexempt funds); Matthews v. Lewis, 617 S.W.2d 43, 43 (Ky. 1981) (even
though benefit recipient commingled exempt funds with nonexempt funds in recipient's bank
account, benefits remained exempt from creditors). The United States Supreme Court impliedly
discussed the commingling issue in Lawrence v. Shaw. 300 U.S. 245, 249 (1945). In Shaw, the
Supreme Court noted that exempt funds a recipient deposits in a bank account would retain
exempt status so long as any person could show that the funds in the bank account came from
exempt sources. Id. at 247-48. In effect, Shaw implies that commingling is not an issue as long
as tracing or identifying the exempt source of the funds is not a problem. See id.; accord General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Falcone, 130 N.J. Super. 517, 518, 327 A.2d 699, 700 (1974) (ex-
emption applies to benefits recipient deposited in bank account so long as court can identify
exempt source of benefits); supra notes 51-56 (commingling exempt funds with nonexempt funds
does not destroy funds' exempt status if recipient can trace funds to exempt source).
76. See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text (statutorily exempt funds retain exemp-
tion upon deposit in bank account).
77. See infra note 78 and accompanying text (garnishing creditor and bank exercising right
to setoff occupy similar positions when bank and creditor are trying to satisfy debt from funds
in debtor's bank accounts).
78. See Havelock Bank of Lincoln v. Hog Confinement Sys., Inc., 214 Neb. 783, 335 N.W.2d
765 (1983). In Havelock Bank of Lincoln v. Hog Confinement Sys., Inc., a judgment creditor
attempted to garnish funds in a debtor's bank account. Id. at 784, 335 N.W.2d at 766. The
debtor contended that the funds on deposit were exempt because the funds were Social Security
benefits. Id. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that Social Security benefits a recipient deposited
in a bank account were exempt from state garnishment proceedings. Id. Havelock and Bernardini
are similar because the Bank in Bernardini and the garnishing creditor in Havelock attempted
to reach funds in a bank account that the depositor claimed were exempt from creditors.
79. See, e.g., Anderson v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 151 Ga. App. 573, 574, 260 S.E.2d
501, 502 (1979) (garnishing creditor cannot reach exempt funds in bank account because exempt
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allow the garnishing creditor to reach exempt funds since allowing the creditor
to garnish the funds once the recipient has deposited the funds in a bank ac-
count would defeat the purpose of providing for the recipient's basic needs
that the exemption statute protects.80
A garnishing creditor normally has to give notice to a debtor before gar-
nishing the debtor's property.8' The Virginia garnishment statute requires a
creditor to prove the existence of his claim against the debtor before the creditor
may garnish the debtor's property.8" The Virginia garnishment statute also
requires that the court clerk or creditor give the debtor notice of the
garnishment. 83 Notice of garnishment enables the debtor to protest a garnish-
ment by asserting any exemptions that the debtor may possess.84 For example,
a debtor in Virginia could assert that funds in a bank account were Social
Security benefits exempt pursuant to federal statute from creditors and,
therefore, that those funds were not subject to a creditor's attempted
garnishment.8" The Bernardini decision also expressly allows banks, and im-
plicitly allows other creditors, to reach funds that federal statutes exempt from
funds recipient deposited in bank account do not lose exempt status); Pease v. North Am. Fin.
Corp., 69 Mich. App. 165, 166, 244 N.W.2d 400, 401 n. 1 (1976) (creditor could not garnish
exempt welfare funds in debtor's bank account because funds retained exemption after recipient
deposited benefits in bank account); Dancer v. Chenault, 527 S.W.2d 714, 717 (Mo. App. 1975)
(state law exemption protected funds in bank account judgment creditor attempted to garnish);
Havelock Bank of Lincoln v. Hog Confinement Sys., Inc., 214 Neb. 783, 784, 335 N.W.2d 765,
766 (1983) (creditor cannot garnish Social Security benefits recipient deposited in bank account
because exemption still applies after recipient deposited funds). But see John 0. Melby. & Co.
Bank v. Anderson, 88 Wis. 2d 254, 259, 276 N.W.2d 274, 278 (1978) (even though deposited
funds were wholly traceable to statutorily exempt payroll earnings, court interpreted statute to
hold that creditor could garnish funds in bank account because exemption does not apply after
deposit).
80. See Anderson v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 151 Ga. App. 573, 574, 260 S.E.2d 501,
502 (1979) (allowing garnishing creditor to reach exempt Social Security funds recipient deposited
in bank account would defeat purpose underlying Social Security exemption).
81. See Havelock Bank of Lincoln v. Hog Confinement Sys., Inc., 214 Neb. 783, 784,
335 N.W.2d 765, 766 (1983) (judgment debtor received notice of creditor's attempted garnish-
ment of debtor's bank account); VA. CODa § 8.01-511 (1950 & repl. vol. 1983) (Virginia garnish-
ment statute requires garnishing creditor to serve summons of garnishment on debtor).
82. See VA. CoDa § 8.01-511 (1950 & repl. vol. 1983) (Virginia garnishment statute requires
judgment creditor to prove his claim before availing himself of garnishment remedy). Section
8.01-537 of the Virginia Code is the Virginia attachment statute. Id. § 8.01-537. A creditor seek-
ing attachment must petition the clerk of the court to obtain a writ of attachment. Id. The creditor
seeking attachment must allege particular grounds for the attachment. Id.; id. § 8.01-534.
83. Id. § 8.01-511.
84. See infra note 85 (example of how notice given to debtor allows debtor to assert possi-
ble defenses).
85. See Harris v. Bailey, 675 F.2d 614, 615 (4th Cir. 1982). In Harris v. Bailey, the plaintiff-
debtor owed money to a hospital. Brief for Appellee at 1, Harris v. Bailey, 675 F.2d 614 (4th
Cir. 1982). The hospital obtained a judgment against the debtor and collected the judgment by
garnishing the debtor's checking account. Id. The funds in the garnished bank account were Social
Security benefits. Id. Because the creditor gave the notice required by the Virginia garnishment
statute, the debtor had the opportunity to challenge the garnishment on the ground that the funds
in the checking account were exempt under federal law. Id. at 1-2. The plaintiff's counsel and
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creditors simply because the beneficiary deposited the funds in a bank ac-
count and commingled the funds with nonexempt funds.86 The Bernardini deci-
sion implicitly allows other creditors to reach exempt funds in a bank account
by holding that such funds lose exempt status upon deposit and commingling.87
The Bernardini decision contradicts court decisions construing federal exemp-
tion statutes that hold exempt funds do not lose exempt status merely by deposit
in a bank account.88 Bernardini, therefore, allows all creditors to reach ex-
empt Social Security benefits a beneficiary deposited in a Virginia bank that
creditors presumably could not reach if the benefits were in a bank in another
state.8 9
Another example of how the Bernardini decision allows Virginia creditors
an unfair advantage over other creditors is evident in comparing the Bernar-
dini holding and its implications with the federal tax lien. 8 The federal tax
lien is a powerful remedy that the federal government can use to collect delin-
quent taxes. 9' A tax lien can reach property that other creditors normally can-
not reach. 9 The federal tax lien also grants the federal government priority
counsel for the hospital subsequently agreed that the funds retained their exempt status even
after the plaintiff had deposited the funds in the bank account. Id. Accordingly, the hospital
returned the funds to the plaintiff. Id. at 2; see Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 56 (3d Cir.
1980) (without notice of garnishment, judgment debtor was not able to assert possible claims
of exemption).
86. See 223 Va. at 521-22, 290 S.E.2d at 464-65 (by holding that Social Security benefits
lose their statutory exemption upon deposit in bank account, Bernardini allows creditors to reach
funds expressly protected from creditors). In Finberg v. Sullivan, a bank obtained a judgment
against a Social Security recipient. 634 F.2d 50, 52 (3d Cir. 1980). The bank attempted to satisfy
its judgment by garnishing the Social Security recipient's bank account. Id. The only funds in
the bank account were Social Security benefits that a recipient previously had deposited. Id. The
Third Circuit held that Social Security benefits are exempt entirely from all creditors even after
a recipient has deposited the benefits in a bank account. Id. at 52. The Finberg court reasoned
that exempting Social Security benefits from legal process has the apparent purpose of furthering
the exemption statute's purpose of protecting benefits from creditors by ensuring that a beneficiary
has interrupted use of funds he receives as benefits. Id. at 63.
87. See 223 Va. at 521-22, 290 S.E.2d at 464-65 (since Bernardini decision holds that ex-
empt funds lose their exempt status upon deposit and commingling, creditors could reach funds
normally unattainable).
88. See supra notes 51-76 and accompanying text (demonstrating Bernardini court incor-
rectly held exempt funds lose exemption when recipient deposits and commingles exempt funds
with nonexempt funds in bank account).
89. Compare Bernardini, 223 Va. at 521-22, 290 S.E.2d at 364-65 (Virginia banks and creditors
can reach exempt Social Security benefits recipient has deposited in bank account because Ber-
nardini holds exempt benefits lose exemption upon deposit and commingling) with Matthews
v. Lewis, 617 S.W.2d 43, 44-45 (Ky. 1981) (Kentucky banks and creditors cannot reach exempt
benefits recipient has deposited in bank account because exempt funds retain exemption even
after deposit and commingling) and Colton v. Martell, 79 Misc. 2d 190, 191, 359 N.Y.S.2d 632,
633 (1974) (New York banks and creditors cannot reach exempt Social Security benefits recipient
has deposited in bank account because exempt benefits remain exempt even after deposit).
90. I.R.C. §§ 6321-6326 (1982).
91. See id. § 6321 (tax lien reaches all real or personal property belonging to delinquent
taxpayer); see also United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 736 (1980) (Congress
granted tax lien extraordinary reach superior to other liens); Rice Inv. Co. v. United States, 625
F.2d 565, 568 (5th Cir. 1980) (few liens can prevail against federal tax lien).
92. See D. EpsT in & J. LANDERS, DEBTORS AND CREDiToRs 326 (2d ed. 1982) (tax lien
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over certain creditors. 9" As powerful as the federal tax lien is, however, it
cannot reach funds that are exempt under state Workmen's Compensation
statutes. 94 By holding that Workmen's Compensation funds lose exempt status
upon deposit in a bank account, the Bernardini decision allows a bank to
reach funds that the federal tax lien could not reach. 9
In addition to basing its decision on the ground that the depositor destroyed
the exempt status of the funds by depositing and commingling the exempt
funds with nonexempt funds in a bank account, the Bernardini court also
based its decision on the ground that a depositor easily could ensure that funds
remain exempt by depositing those funds in a special bank account.96 The
idea that depositors could ensure that funds would retain exempt status upon
deposit in a special account may be unfounded because in Virginia, some banks
will not open an account in which deposits automatically are exempt from
creditors. 97 Some Virginia bankers have stated that a bank would have no
reaches property other creditors could not reach); see also I.R.C. § 6334(a)(l)-(a)(10) (1982) (since
tax lien specifically does not exempt Social Security benefits, federal government using tax lien
is one of few creditors able to penetrate broad Social Security benefit exemption).
93. I.R.C. § 6323 (1982). The federal tax lien has priority over all creditors except pur-
chasers, holders of security interests, mechanic's lienors, or judgment lien creditors even if the
Internal Revenue Service has not filed notice of the tax lien. Id.
94. Id. § 6334(a)(7).
95. See 223 Va. at 521, 290 S.E.2d at 464 (Bernardini decision allows creditors to reach
exempt Workmen's Compensation benefits once recipient has deposited benefits in bank account);
infra text accompanying note 97 (Bernardini decision allows Virginia banks and creditors to reach
exempt Workmen's Compensation benefits that federal government using federal tax lien could
not reach).
96. 223 Va. at 522, 290 S.E.2d at 465; see infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (inter-
views with Virginia bankers concerning whether depositors could set up special accounts contain-
ing funds exempt from creditor action).
97. See Interview with John Mapp, Executive Vice President of First American Bank, Lex-
ington, Virginia in Lexington, Virginia (Jan. 17, 1984) (hereinafter cited as Mapp Interview).
Mapp stated that his bank will not set Aup special accounts containing only exempt funds that
would prevent all creditors from reaching those funds. Id. Mapp said that a bank would not
set up a special exempt account because the bank would have no way of determining if the funds
the depositor deposited in the account were actually from exempt sources. Id.; see Interview with
Ed McCall, Vice President of United Virginia Bank, Lexington, Virginia, in Lexington, Virginia
(Jan. 17, 1984) (hereinafter cited as McCall Interview). McCall stated that his bank has no method
for allowing a depositor to establish a special account containing exempt funds which would
be beyond the reach of creditors. Id.; see Interview with Curtiss E. Cook, Vice President of
Dominion Bank, Lexington, Virginia, in Lexington, Virginia (Jan. 17, 1984) (hereinafter cited
as Cook Interview). Cook said that his bank does not open accounts specifically designated as
containing only exempt funds that would keep creditors from reaching those funds. Id. Cook
explained that a bank could not take responsibility for denying a creditor access to a specific
account simply because the depositor claimed that the funds were exempt from creditors. Id.;
see also Letter from John B. Bowers, Vice President of the Virginia Bankers Association to Samuel
P. Thomas, Jr., April 2, 1984 (hereinafter cited as Bowers Letter). Bowers, in response to the
question of whether Virginia banks will open special accounts exempt from creditors, said Virginia
banks generally will open accounts for any "legitimate reason." Id. Bowers did not explain whether
a legitimate reason included a special account containing funds exempt from creditors. See id.
Bowers also said banks would have no way of determining the source of funds in a particular
account. Id. While never specifically discussing accounts containing exempt funds, Bowers did
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way of policing or regulating a special account containing funds supposedly
exempt from creditors98 since a bank would have no way of knowing if the
deposits in a special account actually came from exempt funds.9 9 Some Virginia
bankers also stated that banks do not inquire into whether depositors realize
that certain funds are exempt from creditors when a depositor is opening a
new account.' 0
In addition to the unfounded rationale that depositors could establish
special accounts containing exempt funds, a third reason the Bernardini deci-
sion is suspect is that the court characterized the issue as whether the Bank
had knowledge of the special account instead of examining whether the funds
in the account retained exempt status. 1 Normally, a bank may not setoff
funds in a special purpose account if the bank has knowledge of the special
purposes of the account.' 2 Special purpose accounts are accounts over which
the depositor has only limited control.' 3 For example, one type of special
mention that a trust account is one method by which a depositor could protect deposits from
creditor action. Id.
98. Cook Interview, supra note 97. Cook stated that a bank could not regulate or ascertain
the source of funds in an allegedly exempt account. Id. Similarly, Mapp explained that his bank
would not set up a special account containing only exempt funds because such an account would
be too expensive for the bank to police. Mapp Interview, supra note 97.
99. Cook Interview, supra note 97. Cook stated a bank could not tell whether the funds
in a special account exempt from creditors came from exempt sources such as Social Security
or from nonexempt sources such as rental income from a farm. Id. Cook said that it would
be expensive for his bank to determine whether funds in an account are exempt or nonexempt.
Id. Cook also stated that setoff is a remedy that his bank rarely uses because a depositor in
financial trouble with the bank is unlikely to have any money in his account that the bank could
setoff. Id.; see McCall Interview, supra note 97. McCall stated that it would be expensive for
a bank to notify depositors about a possible setoff or to ascertain the source of funds in a par-
ticular account. Id. McCall did state, however, that his bank seldom exercised its right of setoff. Id.
100. McCall Interview, supra note 97. McCall said that his bank did not-ask a new depositor
if the depositor realized that certain sources of funds are exempt from creditors. Id. Similarly,
Bowers, who is Vice President of the Virginia Bankers Association, said that Virginia banks do
not ask a depositor opening a new account if the depositor would like to open a special account
exempt from creditors. Bowers Letter, supra note 97. Bowers explained that banks set up special
purpose accounts in response to customer inquiry. See id. Bowers further explained, however,
that he doubted if customers would open accounts with the purpose of preventing creditors from
reaching the funds in the account. See id. Bowers concluded that customers probably are not
thinking about preventing creditors from reaching funds in a bank account when the customer
opens a new account. Id.
101. See infra notes 102-118 and accompanying text (Bernardini court mischaracterized issue
in case as whether depositor's account was special purpose account instead of examining whether
Bank could setoff account containing exempt funds).
102. See Sun Bank of Miami v. E.C. Ernst, Inc., 395 So. 2d 282, 283 (Fla. 1981) (bank
could not setoff special account depositor set up for special purpose); supra notes 10-15 and
accompanying text (bank cannot setoff special purpose accounts).
103. See TeSelle, supra note 1, at 46 (special purpose account is account in which depositor
only has limited control since third party also had control over account); infra notes 104-105
and accompanying text (example of special purpose account over which party depositing funds
in account has limited control because third party also has interest in account); see also In re
Saugus Gen. Hosp., Inc., 7 Bankr. 347, 352-53 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980), rev'd on other grounds,
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purpose account is an escrow account, which is generally held in the name
of the depositor and a real estate broker, that contains funds a bank holds
for a specific purpose and releases to a third party when a specific event
occurs.1 14 The real estate broker cannot use the funds in the account and the
bank cannot setoff the funds to satisfy debts the broker owes since the funds
actually belong to the broker's customer.'05 A bank has knowledge of a special
purpose account if the depositor labels the account in such a way that it is
clear that the account is a special account.1 6 The bank also has knowledge
of a special purpose account if the depositor and the bank have entered into
an agreement giving the bank notice of the special purpose of the account.'
0 7
A special purpose account defeats a bank's right to setoff because a third
party who is not a debtor of the bank has an interest in the account.' 8 Since
a party other than the bank's debtor has an interest in the funds on deposit
in a special account, the bank may not exercise its right to setoff the property
not belonging to the debtor.'0 9 The Bernardini court mistakenly based its rul-
ing on the analysis of whether the bank had knowledge of the special purpose
account instead of determining whether a bank can setoff an account contain-
ing statutorily exempt funds."10 The Bank's knowledge of the nature of the
698 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1983) (payroll account is special account because depositor's employees
have specific interest in funds employer has deposited in account).
104. See Stoddard v. Gookin, - Mont. - , -, 625 P.2d 529, 534 (1981) (third party
has interest in escrow account since bank wilf release funds to third party when specific event occurs).
105. See First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Osage Supply Co., 186 Okla. 259, 261, 97 P.2d
3, 5 (1939) (since third party not owing money to bank has interest in escrow account, bank
cannot setoff escrow account).
106. See TeSelle, supra note 1, at 46-47 (bank knows of special purpose account when bank
or depositor has labeled account in such manner that account is clearly special purpose account).
107. See First Nat'l Bank v. Barger, 115 S.W. 726, 728 (Ky. 1909) (agreement between bank
and depositor establishing special account provides notice to bank or special purposes for ac-
count use); Hudson United Bank v. House of Supreme, Inc., 149 N.J. Super. 153, 158, 337
A.2d 438, 440-41 (1975) (bank could not setoff special purpose account bank established pur-
suant to agreement between bank and depositor); see also First City Nat'l Bank of Oxford v.
Long-Lewis Hardware Co., 363 So. 2d 770, 773 (Ala. 1978) (bank cannot setoff against special
purpose account when bank has knowledge of special purpose).
108. See TeSelle, supra note 1, at 46. By definition, a third party has an interest in a special
purpose account because the depositor opening the account does not completely control the ac-
count. Id. Since a third party has an interest in the account, such as the employee's interest
in a payroll account or the trust beneficiaries' interest in a trust account, the third party has
some control over the account. Id. at 46-47. Because more than one person has an interest in
a special purpose account, the bank cannot exercise setoff against the special purpose account
when satisfying a debt unless all the persons having an interest in the account owe the bank. Id.
109. See Clark, supra note 1, at 214-15 (funds on deposit are not sole property of debtor
or property of bank when funds are in special purpose account).
I10. See 223 Va. at 521, 290 S.E.2d at 464. In Bernardini, the court characterized one of
the main issues in the case as the fact that the Bernardinis deposited exempt funds in an account
without telling the bank of the special nature of the funds. See id. The Bernardini court, therefore,
considered the issue in the case as whether the Bank had knowledge of the special purpose ac-
count. Id. Analyzing the issue in Bernardini as whether the account was a special purpose ac-
count was wrong since the despositor had complete control over the account. See TeSelle, supra
note 1, at 46 (special purpose account is account over which depositor only has limited control).
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account was irrelevant since the account in Bernardini was not a special pur-
pose account.' The account at issue in Bernardini was not a special purpose
account because no third party had an interest in the account while the only
people with an interest in the Bamardinis' bank account were the Bernardinis.I 2
Accounts containing statutorily exempt funds do not constitute special
purpose accounts" 3 and are unrelated to the purpose and theory underlying
special purpose accounts." 4 The purpose of exempt funds is to provide in-
come for the recipient of those funds so the recipient can maintain the
necessities of life"' and, therefore, statutory restrictions preventing creditors
from reaching exempt funds further the purpose of exemptions by enabling
the recipient of exempt funds to use those funds for basic needs instead of
having the recipient's creditors absorb those funds in payment of the reci-
pient's debts.' 16 For example, Congress intended Social Security benefits to
Since the account in Bernardini was not a special account, knowledge on the part of the Bank
was irrelevant in the determination of whether the Bank could setoff the depositor's account
containing exempt funds.
111. See supra note 110 (account at issue in Bernardini was account containing exempt funds
and not special purpose account); infra text accompanying note 112 (same).
112. See Anderson v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 151 Ga. App. 573, 574, 260 S.E.2d 501,
502 (1979) (depositor is only party with interest in bank account containing exempt Social Secur-
ity benefits). Special purpose accounts include many different types of accounts, but do not in-
clude accounts containing statutorily exempt funds. See, e.g., Engleman v. Bank of Am. Nat'l
Trust & Say. Ass'n., 98 Cal. App. 2d 327, 330, 219 P.2d 868, 870 (1950) (bank could not setoff
special purpose account consisting of funds depositor pledged as security for specific debts); Clarkson
v. Selected Risk Ins. Co., 170 N.J. Super. 373, 381, 406 A.2d 494, 501 (1979) (bank could not
setoff funds to satisfy individual debt of trustee owed to bank when trustee held funds in account
in trust for third party); Houston Nat'l Bank v. Biber, 613 S.W.2d 771, 774 (Tex. Civ. App.
1981) (bank could not setoff special purpose account having characteristic of bailment agreement).
113. See supra note 112 (special purpose accounts do not include general accounts contain-
ing exempt funds).
114. Compare TeSelle, supra note 1, at 46 (theory underlying special purpose account is
that depositor has only limited interest in account) with supra note 112 and accompanying text
(depositor is only person with interest in account containing exempt funds). Cases dealing with
a bank's right of setoff against special purpose accounts discuss the type of account, and not
the source of funds a depositor has deposited in an account. See, e.g., In re Saugus, 7 Bankr.
347, 353 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980) (type of account, not source of funds contained within account,
prevents bank from exercising setoff), rev'd on other grounds, 698 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1983); First
City Nat'l Bank of Oxford v. Long-Lewis Hardware Co., 363 So. 2d 770, 773 (Ala. 1978) (same);
Hudson United Bank v. House of Supreme, Inc., 149 N.J. Super. 153, 156, 373 A.2d 438, 440-41
(1977) (same).
115. See United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 711 (1947) (overall objective of Social Security
system is protection of benefit recipients from "hardships of existence"); Lawrence v. Shaw,
300 U.S. 245, 250 (1937) (purpose of veterans' benefits payments exempt from creditors under
federal statute is support and maintenance of benefit recipients); Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank,
11 Cal. 3d 352, 370, 521 P.2d 441, 451, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449, 459 (1974) (policy underlying exemp-
tion of disability benefits from creditors is that benefit recipients should use benefits to support
families); Matthews v. Lewis, 617 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Ky. 1981) (purpose of Workmen's Compensa-
tion benefits is to support injured people).
116. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (exemption from creditor action against
support benefits furthers purpose of providing basic maintenance for recipients).
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provide a source of income to the elderly for basic needs." 7 By mistakenly
examining whether the Bank had knowledge of the special purpose account
instead of properly examining if and when the funds in the Bernardinis' ac-
count lost exempt status, the Bernardini decision allowed the Bank to reach
Social Security benefits in contravention of the federal exemption statute." 8
As a result of the Virginia Supreme Court's decision in Bernardini, a
Virginia bank's extensive right of setoff effectively contravenes both federal
and state policies underlying statutes exempting certain benefits from the reach
of the recipient's creditors.' 9 Moreover, Bernardini enables creditor-banks to
setoff exempt funds in a depositor-debtor's account that a garnishing creditor
could not reach. 2 The Bernardini decision also allows banks to setoff funds
in a depositor-debtor's account without having to comply with the provisions
of Virginia's garnishment statute.' 2' Since creditors attempting to garnish a
debtor's bank account must comply with the Virginia garnishment statute and
give debtors notice and opportunity to protest the garnishment, Bernardini
contravenes the policy underlying the Virginia garnishment statute by allow-
ing banks to setoff funds before the depositor may protest. 2 Unless the
Virginia Supreme Court realizes that its decision in Bernardini contravenes
the policies underlying several state and federal statutes, the Virginia legislature
should consider adopting legislation to correct the inappropriate result in
Bernardini.23 The Virginia legislature could amend the Virginia exemption
statutes making it clear that the statutes apply to a bank's right of setoff,
and that the statutory exemption remains in force even if the recipient of ex-
empt funds deposits those funds in a bank account. 2 Although the Virginia
117. See United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 710 (1947) (Congress and President designed
Social Security system to help solve financial difficulties of life facing elderly people); see also
Letter from Wilbur S. Cohen to Paul Aiken, June 22, 1972, Appendix A, Brief for Petitioner,
Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413 (1973). Mr. Cohen was a member of the
legislative staff in 1935 responsible for following the Social Security bill through Congress. Id.
Mr. Cohen stated that people involved with the bill generally understood that Social Security
payments would not be subject to any legal process. Id. Mr. Cohen said that the legislative intent
underlying Social Security payments was to provide recipients a guaranteed payment every month
with no possibility that a third party could intervene. Id. Mr. Cohen concluded Congress definite-
ly intended the Social Security exemption to be unqualified and absolute. Id.
118. See supra notes 101-117 and accompanying text (demonstrating Bernardini approach
of incorrectly using special purpose analysis contravenes policy underlying exemption statutes).
119. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (demonstrating that Bernardini decision
contravenes policy underlying federal and state exemption statutes).
120. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text Bernardini holding places bank in posi-
tion superior to nonbank creditors).
121. See supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text (Bernardini decision allows banks to setoff
accounts containing exempt funds without giving depositor chance to assert possible exemption
defenses).
122. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (demonstrating that Bernardini contravenes
policy underlying garnishment).
123. See infra text accompanying notes 124-128 (suggested changes in Virginia law that would
correct improper decision of Virginia Supreme Court in Bernardino.
124. See VA. CoNsT. art. IV, § 14. Section 14 of article IV of the Virginia Constitution
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legislature cannot amend the federal Social Security statute, 125 the legislature
could pass legislation specifically regulating a bank's right to setoff funds.' 2 6
The law regulating a bank's right to setoff could require a court or the bank
to hold a hearing within five days after the setoff so that the depositor would
have a chance to assert any possible claim of exemption. For example, the
bank could freeze temporarily the depositor's account and give the depositor
five days to demonstrate that the funds in the account came from exempt
sources. The notice to the depositor whose funds the bank had setoff should
include a list of sources of funds, such as Social Security or Workmen's Com-
pensation, that are exempt from the bank's right of setoff.' At the hearing,
if the depositor could demonstrate that the deposits came from exempt funds,
the bank should return the setoff funds to the depositor's account.'2 The
suggested statute on a bank's right of setoff would correct the incorrect deci-
sion reached by the Virginia Supreme Court in Bernardini by allowing a
depositor to assert possible claims of exemption, thereby preventing a creditor
bank from exercising setoff against funds that exemption statutes protect.
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grants authority to the Virginia legislature to enact or amend laws on all subjects except those
subjects the Virginia Constitution specifically has forbidden or restricted. Id. The Virginia Con-
stitution does not forbid the passing of laws covering exemption statutes. See id.
125. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1982) (Congress enacted Social Security law and, therefore,
Virginia could not amend Social Security statutes).
126. See VA. CODE §§ 6.1-1 to -397 (1950 & repl. vol. 1983) (since Virginia can pass laws
regulating banking industry, Virginia legislature presumably could pass law regulating bank's
right of setoff.
127. See Letter from Virginia Attorney General to all Judges, Clerks, Sheriffs, and Other
State Officials Empowered to Issue, Enforce, or Serve Garnishment Process in the Commonwealth
of Virginia (Nov. 23, 1983). In response to a decision concerning the Virginia garnishment statute,
the Virginia Attorney General issued a letter containing guidelines for serving garnishments. Id.
The proposed guidelines contained a form that would inform a debtor of possible property or
benefits that would be exempt from garnishment. Id. The form explicitly mentioned such specific
exemptions as Social Security benefits, Unemployment Compensation benefits, and veteran's
benefits. Id. The form also would provide a specific place on the form for the debtor to claim
the exemptions before the garnishment would take place. Id.
128. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussing tracing issue and how depositor
could trace funds to exempt source).
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